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P.O. Box 246 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TilE STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER L. and SHERYL C. BREWCR, husband 
and wife; TED LCE and ANNE G. DAUGHERTY, 
husband and wife; BERT L. and DIANNA L. 
DEIHHS, husband and wife; ARVEL V. and 
ZELLA E. HANSEN, husband and wife; KENNETH 
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JAMES A. and JOANNE MOSER, husband and wife; 
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as assignee of MAY ELLISON, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C!IAD PEATROSS and CARMA S. 
PEATROSS, husband and wife, 
Defendants - Appellants. 
CASE NO. 16027 
RESPONDENTS' REPLY TO BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents reassert the position and statements made in 
their reply to the brief of t_he appellant, relative to the 
nature of the case, the disposition in the lower court, and 
the relief sought by the respondent on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent reasserts the fact that both the appellant 
and the runicus Curiae have a misunderstanding as to the facts 
as they actually existed. Plaintiff draws to the court's 
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attention Exhibit "P-2", which especially establishes: 
a. The date Roosevelt City adopted its ordinance 
specifying its intention to create a special improvement 
district; 
b. The date by which all protests concerning the same 
were to be filed; 
c. The date for a public hearing concerning the same. 
It is to be further !"}oted that Exhibit "P-2" included 
the entire City of Roosevelt within its boundaries and made 
no exclusions therefrom and thus the subject property was 
included within said district .• Subsequently, it was 
ascertained by the Roosevelt City Bond Attorney that certain 
subdivisions may have been improperly annexed to the Ci t.y, 
and although the improvements were already installed, the 
City then completed proper annexation of the subdivisions and 
adopted Exhibit. "P-3". This action was a formal attempt by 
the City to correct the previous oversight on annexations, 
before the ordinance levying the assessments was adopted. 
Based on the dates specified in Exhibit "P-2", and 
comparing the same with the dates in Exhibits "P-4", "P-5", 
"P-6 .. , "P-7", "P-8", "P-9", "P-10", 11 P-ll", "P-12", "P-13" 
and "P-14" it is obvious that each of the plaintiffs 
purchased his property from the defendants substantially 
after the creation of the improvement district. In addition, 
it is to be noted that the improvements for which the 
improvement district was created were commenced 
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In fact, the uncontradicted test_imony of the plaintiff 
Roger Brewer was as follows: 
"· •• and in coming back with him, we asked him about the 
curb and gutter and the streets on the lots we were 
interest_ed in, and because at that on that given day 
they were surfacing t_he st-reet there by his house." --
(Supp. Trial Transcript p. 4, lines 1=4) _____ __ 
In addition Mr. Brewer's uncontradicted testiony was as 
follows: 
Q. (Mr. Mangan) Now, Mr. Brewer, will you go ahead and 
tell us what was stated at the time about the pazment? 
(sic. pa~ement) 
A. At that time, and having asked him, he said that 
they would either install it or tnat they would have it 
installed through the special improvement district. 
(Supp. Trial Transcript, p. 6, lines 16-20) 
J:'he costs of these improvement_s were discussed by the 
plaintiff Brewer with the defendants' agent !1r. Gordon. That 
testimony was as follows: 
Q. Go ahead and tell us what was said. 
A. And at the time that we were ordering it we made 
sure that our understanding that these, that t_he curb 
and gutter and street was included in the total costs 
to us. 
(Supp. Trial Transcript, p. 7, lines 15-18) 
Similar testi~ony was offered by each of the plaintiffs 
and each testimony is consistent with Exhibits "P-3" through 
"P-14", that curb, guttering and street pavement was included 
in the price paid by plaintiffs for the lots. (Supp. Trial 
Transcript, p. 4, lines 1-4) 
Furthennore, in examining each of the Exhibits "P-3" 
through "P-14", it is obvious that the defendants or their 
a?ent did, on the property information and appraisal report 
(FmHA form #427-8, a copy of which is attached to each of 
said exhibits), represent to Farmers Home Administration that 
-3-
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the lot was situated on a road that was or would be paved and 
that curb and gutter was or would be installed. That 
information, signed by defendants or their agent, was used in 
appraising the value of each lot. It is to be noted that the 
appraised value of each lot, with said improvements being 
installed, was the same amount that was in fact paid by the 
individual plaint.iffs to the defendants, for their lots. In 
some instances the defendants also built the plaintiffs their 
home, but in every instance the defendants sold the 
plaintiffs their lot. It is more than coincidental that in 
each instance the appraised value of each lot was the sa•ne 
amount as that paid by the plaintiffs to defendants for the 
lot. In addition, the appraisals reflected that in each 
instance the lot had the curb, gutter and pavement. It is to 
be further noted that due to the size of the project and the 
weather condit.ions in the Uintah Basin during the fall, 
spring and winter, that the installation of the improvements 
for the ent.ire city consumed the summers of 1974, 1975, and 
1976, being completed in August 1976. It was at this time 
that it was ascertained that there had been improper 
annexations of certain subdivisions to the City, which 
problems with annexations were then corrected and a new 
notice of intention to create an Improvement District 
(Exhibit "P-3) was adopted, etc., relative to those areas 
which had previously been improperly annexed, but for which 
improvements had been made. The lots subject to this 
litigation were properly in the City in 1974, so therefore, 
were not included in Exhibit "P-3". After the difficulty of 
-4-
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annexat.ion was corrected, then on or about October 5, 1976, 
Roosevelt City adopted an ordinance levying the assessments 
for said improvements. Said ordinance was introduced at the 
trial as Exhibit "D-25". 
It is also to be noted that the defendants were selling 
numerous lots in this particular area and that the plaintiffs 
introduced uncontradicted testimony of one purchaser, Mr. 
LeMoines DuPaix, that if he would agree to pay for the curb, 
gutter, etc. he would receive a reduction in the price of the 
lot, and some extras for his home. ( Supp. Trial Transcript, 
p. 47, lines l-30) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLD!t1G IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE. 
l. The respondents have no quarrel with the Amicus 
Curiae's cont.ent.ion that a lien does not· occur until the 
municipality has levied an assessment. 
2. The respondents have no quarrel with the Amicus 
Curiae's position that an improvement district lien is of 
statutory origin and that in order to establish the same one 
must strictly comply with the statute. 
3. The plaintiffs assert that both the Amicus Curiae 
and appellants have missed the entire point of the trial 
court's holding, i.e., that while a lien is an encumbrance, 
all encumbrances are not liens. An encumbrance may arise or 
be created by means other than a statute providing for the 
same, and it may never assume the status of a perfected 
-5-
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"lien 11 • 
4. In creating the improvement district, the City of 
Roosevelt followed all of the statutory provisions 
concerning: 
a. publishing notice of the city's intent to 
create an improvement district; 
b. giving notice of the dates for property 
owners to file their protests. 
c. setting a time for a public hearing or 
meeting for hearing protests. 
5. By establishing t_he Improvement District Roosevelt 
City gave the world in general, and all of the property owners 
within the city in particular, full notice of the City's 
intentions. At that point an encumbrance came into existence. 
Whether that encumbrance ripened into a lien is academic and 
beyond the scope of this proceeding. 
6. Both Amicus Curiae and appellants ignore t_he fact 
that every municipality that is properly constituted has its 
own recorder. (See Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-10-60, 
1953, as amended.) And that'the duties of said recorder are 
set forth in the statute as follows: 
"The city recorder shall keep his office at the place 
of meeting of the governing body of the city or at some 
other place convenient thereto as the governing body 
may direct. He shall keep the corporate seal and all 
papers and records of the city and shall keep a record 
of the proceedings of the governing body, whose 
meetings it shall be his duty to attend. Copies of all 
papers filed in his office and transcripts from all 
records of the governing body, certified by him under 
the corporate seal be evidence in all courts as if the 
originals thereof were produced." 
Both appellants and Amicus Curiae miss the point that in 
-6-
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writ_ing title insurance or in warranting title t_o property, 
that all e-ncumbrances do not have to be of record with the 
County Recorder in order to be effective encumbrances. For 
example, a statutory right to file a mechanic's lien may 
exist on the date that the county records are searched by a 
title insurance agent at the County Recorder's office, but 
that right has not yet been perfected, due to the fact that 
the time period allowed by statute for the filing of such a 
1 ien has not expired. Only an actual examination of the 
property itself will reflect or reveal whether there have 
been improvements made on the property for which a lien might 
attach. In actuality there is no way one can assure the 
individual making the search that there is no possibility 
that an encumbrance exists that might ripen into a lien. 
Likewise, any person or tit_le company writing title 
insurance for any property situated within the boundaries of 
any city would not be inconvenienced by checking with the 
appropriate city authorities to see if there are any 
potentia~ liens that might be filed against said property by 
said city. This ~ould seem to be an especially good practice 
inasmuch as each city has an authorized recorder, whose 
duties are clear, and who can answer said questions or 
inquiries. 
7. The utility of the title insurance agent or any 
other person making that simple inquiry, surely outweighs the 
risk of denying a grantee the statutory protection against 
all encumbrances when a grantor conveys by a Warranty Deed. 
8. If Grantors do not wish to warrant against such 
-7-
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potential encumbrances, they can easily include a disclaimer 
regarding the same in the language of the Deed. The utility 
of requiring such a disclaimer, when weighed against the risk 
of limiting the right of grantee under a Warranty Deed, 
snould resolve itself in favor of not denying grantees 
,t::r·:Jtection a,;ainst the er:cumbrance existing at the time of 
the conveyance .. 
POINT TWO 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF DOES NOT ADDRESS 
ITSELF TO COURT'S NARROW HOLDING. 
1. Amicus Curiae and appellants missed the thrust of 
the holding of the trial court relative to an encumbrance. 
The length of time and the manner in which an improvement 
district encumbrance can be perfected into a lien is set 
forth in the statute, i.e., it is perfected by adopting the 
ordinance levying the assessment in the manner prescribed by 
statute. Once the ordinance levying the assessment is 
enacted, then simple inquiry of the city recorder will inform 
any prospective title insurance company of whether additional 
ordinances levying further assessments can be cont.emplated. 
Furthermore, as indicated above, a simple inquiry of the city 
recorder will also inform any title insurance company of 
whether there are any city improvement districts, not yet 
recorded ~ith the county recorder, which may further encumber 
<:nc; property. 
2. On page 6 of the Amicus Curiae Brief, it. 1s argued 
cna~ the creation of the improvement d1strict significantly 
-8-
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increased the value of each lot. Respondents reply by 
agreeing to the same, and by pointing out as set forth in 
Statement of Fact above. That is why plaintiffs paid more 
for each lot than did Mr. DuPaix. (Op. Cit.) 
3. Each of the plaintiffs purchased the property in 
question with the understanding that the pavement, curb, and 
gutter were included in the purchase price. The defendants' 
subsequent failure to pay for the improvements, after 
allegedly making representations to the plaintiffs that the 
same would be included in the price of the lot, appears to be 
a breach of both the written and verbal warranties made by 
the defendants, or their agent, to the plaintiffs. 
Specifically, it was a breach of the general statutory 
warranty against encumbrances when a warranty deed was 
utilized. 
4. Amicus Curiae attempts in its brief to either 
distinguish or belittle wast of the authorities cited in 
respondents' brief. However, a close examination of Amicus 
Curiae's arguments reveals its inability to adequately do so. 
The points of law· argued by the respondents in their original 
reply brief are correct principals of law. The fact is that 
the Utah Stat.ute does not address itself as to when the 
encumbrance ;o-·ises, but merely limits itself to the question 
of when the lien arises. 
5. Furthermore, Amicus Curiae entirely ignores the 
comments and conclusions reached by Thompson on Real 
Property, as to what an encumbrance is. 
-9-
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DID NOT EXCEED THE PLEADING. 
l. Respondents would suggest that a reading of the 
plaintiffs' complaint would indicate that Amicus Curiae 
either has not read the same, or has read some other document 
that was not plead by the respondents. 
2. The prayer of the plaintiffs' complaint is as 
follows: 
"Wherefore, plaintiffs' pray for relief of this 
l. An order requiring the defendants to pay for 
the assessments against their individual properties by 
the Roosevelt City I~prove~ent District. 
2. For damages of not less than $10,000.00 each. 
3. For breach of warranty in the form of 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs of court.." 
There is no other language or verbage used by the 
plaintiffs in their prayer, other than as is set forth above. 
3. Even if the matters were as suggested by Amicus 
Curiae, the provisions of Rule lSB, URCP, make it clear that 
said s'"'"''-'~cc~ion is now without merit, inasmuch as there was 
no objection during the trial by the defendants, as to any of 
G~CF; ~ne sa~~ was tr1ea oy ~~~u~~ consent of ~P~ par~1es. 
4. In no event was there any preJudice or surprise 
worked ..:;:;;:-. ::Tie defendants by reason of the testimony offered 
,_._ ................ , C.O Lllt:: 
~c~~~~=-"s on numerous occasions through Interrogatories. 
5 · The point is made on page 9 of Amicus Curiae Brief 
-lC-
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that t.he clefendants were further prejudiced by the court 
holding on a theory not cont.ained in the pleadings, i.e., 
that the special improve1nent district was an encumbrance. 
Respondents would urge that a careful scrutiny of that 
argument will reveal that it simply won't hold water. First, 
attention is drawn to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaintiffs' 
complaint, which specifically set forth plaintiffs' theory 
that the defendants warranted title to certain lots to each 
of the plaintiffs, which meant that the land would be free 
and clear of any and all encumbrances of any kind. 
6. That the defendants have never objected either at 
the time of the trial or in their own brief that they were 
surprised by plaintiffs' theory relative to encumbrances. 
7. In reply to the allegations of the last paragraph on 
page 9 of the Amicus Curiae Brief, appellants would suggest 
t.hat t.he notice of intent published by Roosevelt City was 
sufficient to inform the parties of the intent of Roosevelt 
City, and that the formality of the introduction of the 
resolution or ordinance establishing the district was 
unnecessary. Besides, it was counsel for the defendants that 
desired to stipulate as to the existence of the first 
improvement the trial court's decision. 
POilJT FOUR 
CREATION OF A SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT DID 
CONSTITUTE A PRESENT ENCUMBRANCE OF THE PROPERTY. 
1. runicus Curiae correctly yuotes from section 2 of the 
resolution establishing the Improvement District, in that the 
-11-
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City could at any time hereafter exclude any portion of the 
City from the district. (Appendix A, Appellants' Brief). 
2. The tespondent reasserts the fact that inasmuch as 
the City Recorder keeps track of and records all of the 
transactions of a municipality, said recorder is in a prime 
position to be able to inform the appellants or Amicus 
Curiae, or any other person or party, of whether any portion 
of the city had been excluded [om the improvement district. 
3. It was stipulated and agreed by the parties and by 
the Roosevelt City Attorney, Mr. Mitton, in his testimony 
that a bona fide improvement district did exist relative to 
the subject property. Counsel for the appellant questioned 
City Attorney as follows: 
Q. (Mr. ~1cKeachnie) All right. Then Mr. Mitton, for 
your information we have heretofore stipulated that the 
properties involved here are in special improvement 
district number l. 
A. (rqr. Mitton) Okay. But that would be the original 
improvement district then created in April of 1974. 
(See Transcript p. 140, lines 4-8) 
4. Contrary to the representations by Amicus Curiae, 
the reservation on the part of the City to be able to exclude 
any portion of the City does not, in or of itself, negate the 
existence or the possibility of an encumbrance. It should 
merely identify for the cautious the possibility that while 
they may be released from an enclllnbrance, there is the 
necessity of checking with the proper authority, i.e., the 
City Recorder to ascertain the same. 
5. It must further be noted that put-,ouant to the 
statutory authority found in 10-lG-12, UCA, l9'J3 c~s alltCfl<lt•d, 
that Roosevelt City, from and after the ct·cat ion of the 
-12-
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'district in April 1974, had the authority and right to levy 
an assessment against the subject property. 
6. The power to levy an assessment is an encumbrance 
against the property, from the time the power to levy is 
created until it is perfected into a lien. 
7. The Roosevelt City Attorney, called by the 
appellants as t_heir witness, testified relative to the same 
as follows: 
Q. (Mr. Mangan)---The statutory authority of 10-16-12 
gives them (Roosevelt City) that authority at any time, 
doesn't it? 
A. (Mr. Mitton) Yes, it does. 
Q. All right, then so any time after February of 1974 
and the final adoption of the improvement district in 
April of 1974 the city had the authority and the right 
to levy an assessment at that point. Is that right? 
A. That's right. 
(Transcript p. 148, lines 5-12) 
8. The arguments raised by Amicus Curiae in the last 
paragraph on page ll and in the first two paragraphs on page 
12 actually beg the question. Amicus Curiae interchanges the 
use of the words "encumbrance" and "lien", as if they were 
totally synonymous. Respondents again suggest that while all 
liens are encumbrances, all encumbrances are not liens. The 
important language relative to section 4 of the resolution 
crea~1ng the improvement dis~rict is as follows: 
" ... That the City is hereby authorized in due course to 
:!.9vy assessments upon the property described in t_he 
notice of intention to pay for the improvements t_o be 
.,.c;ce and the Citv officials of said City are hereby 
di~ec~ed to p~cceed to construe~ the said 
i mnrovemen ts." [ Emphas 1s added] 
(See AppendTx A, Appellants' Brief) 
Respondents urge that the language quoted est_ablishes 
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that the city, in due course, may perfect a lien against the 
property, but that a diligent and accurate reading of the 
language would clearly indicate that from that point forward 
the property was encumbered. 
9. Respondents do not argue or urge upon the court the 
proposition that the creation of an improvement encumbrance 
on the subject properties, notwithstanding the ordinance 
assessing the lien, had not then been adopted. 
10. Amicus Curiae makes much of the Maryland decision 
of Strass et al v. District~ Realty Title Insurance Corp., 
31 Md. App. 690, 358 A.2d 251, (1976), to suggest that the 
trial court reached an incorrect conclusion. nevertheless, 
Amicus Curiae's brief does reluctantly admit that the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the assessments 
of an Improvement District in that state were not 
encumbrances until they were inevitable, and that as long as 
the city had t_he opt ion to levy them or not, they were not 
inevitable. By making this admission, the Amicus Curiae 
acknowledges that the Roosevelt City Special Improvement 
District ceased to be an optional encumbrance, and was a bona 
fide encumbrance against the subject property, from and after 
at least May, 1974, inasmuch as the Improvement District had 
in fact let the contract for the improvements by that date. 
The Trial Court specifically found that fact when it held as 
follows: 
"2. . .. I:;. '~ "1 J.., 
.... - ... - - - -. 
'''- '-'---~~-.I 
improvements." 
1974, Roosevelt City proceeded to 
contract for the constructing of 
let 
the 
7hus from and after May, 1974, Roosevelt City had no 
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discretion as to whether it would levy an assessment against 
the subject property, for onoe the contract was let and 
improvements commenced, the obligation of the improvement 
district to pay for the same could not be optional, but was 
mandatory. The mere fact that an extensive length of time 
was required within which to complete the improvements, 
should make no difference as to t_he legal effect of the 
creation of the District; the letting of the contract; or of 
the obligation of the Improvement District to pay for the 
improvements installed. 
The Roosevelt City Attorney, Mr. Mitton, testified, when 
questioned about the advertising for the improvements and the 
commencement of the actual installation of the same, as 
follows: 
A. Yes, I believe the improvements went in very 
quickly after the adoption of or the creation of the 
District. 
(See Record, page 143, lines 4-6) 
Mr. Mitton further explained, following the above testimony, 
that the work was not completed in 1974, due to weather, and 
the entire project was not finished until August, 1976, at 
which time the City elected which of the three alternatives 
it would follow in making assessments for the improvements, 
namely to make the assessments after all of the work for the 
improvements was completed. 
11. Not only must one take a close look at the wordin~ 
of the Resolution adopting the Improvement District, but c~c 
must also consider what actually happened. Regardless of the 
so-called "permissive" language in the Ordinance creating the 
Improvement District, there can be no denial of the fact that 
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the District was not permissive. It immediatley advertised 
for and entered into a contract to construct and/or install 
the enumerated improvements. All of t_hese relevant events 
occurred prior to each of the plaintiffs obtaining their 
deeds from the defendants. 
12. An encumbrance is an encumbrance from the date a 
person, party or governmental entity has the right to take 
additional steps or otherwise effect a lien against the same. 
Other encumbrances may be created as particular fact 
situations will warrant. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT UNDERMINE THE 
MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT ACT AND DOES NOT 
ADVERSELY EFFECT CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY. 
l. The Municipal Improvement District Act does not 
specify nor limit as to when an encumbrance attaches and 
therefore nothing in the trial court's decision undermines 
it. 
2. The trial court•s· decision actually enhances the 
understanding as to what a warranty is. 
3. The trial court's decision does not adopt a new 
means of encumbering property. It merely defines when an 
encumbrance occurs. The statute sets forth means by which a 
municipality creates a lien against property and not an 
encumbrance. 
4. The trial court's decision requires parties to 
clearly define what is or is not being warranted in oruer to 
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avoid difficulty over the term encumbrance. The risk of 
allowing a grantor to convey property subject to encumbrances 
and escape the liability for that conveyance versus the 
utility of requiring the grantor to specify what is or is not 
included· in the warranty is such that the trial court's 
decision should be upheld. 
5. There is no superiority to the statutory position 
because the statutory position is silent as to the time the 
encumbrance attaches. It only speaks relative to when the 
lien attaches, with which position the respondents and 
appellants have no argument. 
6. Any person or party, including title insurance 
companies, desiring to know whether an encumbrance may exist 
against property can easily find out by examining the records 
of the City Recorder of any municipality. 
7. While it is true that t.he parties to a real estate 
transaction may not know the exact amount of a pot.ential 
assessment, notice of intent clearly identifies the projected 
cost of which the parties could at least project what they 
should anticipate as costs. Furthermore, the parties have 
t.he ability t.o contract between themselves as to which will 
be responsible. Respondent urges that the risk involved 
versus the ut.ility of what can be done would suggest the 
responsibility being upon the grantor until such time as it 
specifically and exactly shifts to the grantee. 
8. The trial court's d·ecision should have no 
detrimental effect upon the issuance of title insurance 
within this state. Respondent attaches hereto a Schedule B 
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for Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. for ALPA owner's 
policy as amended on October 10, 1977, which specifically 
points out: 
"This policy does not insure by loss by reason of the 
following: 
Part I: This part of Schedule B refers to matters 
which, if any such exist, may affect the title to said 
land, but which are not shown in this policy: 
5. Proceedings for municipal improvement, which, at 
the date hereof, are shown by the official records of 
any such city, but have not resulted in the imposition 
of a lien upon, or establishment of an easement over, 
or the adj ud ica t ion of the right to a public use of 
said land or any part thereof." 
(See Appendix A) 
9. Respondent. would again urge that notwithstanding 
arguments of Amicus Curiae the fact is that other tit.le 
insurance companies are coping with the problem of 
improvement districts. The risk of allowing such an 
encumbrance to interfere with a grantee's warranted title to 
property versus the utility of the title insurance company 
making the necessary checks with the City Recorder and/or 
maintaining a file of such activities, is such that the 
utilit.y outweighs the risks in favor of the trial court's 
decision. 
10. It is to be rc>called that the appellants in this 
case were able to cope with the problem relative to whether 
the improvements would be included in the purchase price of 
the lot by giving Mr. Lee DuPaix a $720 credit plus 
additional benefits to his home if he would pay for the 
improvements himself. Such ahility for buyers and sellers to 
deal at arms lc>ngth on such matters has no prime c>ffect upon 
ability of persons in the market place to deal with each 
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other, and can in no reasonable manner be construed as being 
fatal to such transactions. 
11. The trial court's decision does not imply nor 
suggest that the warranties set forth in 57-1-12, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, are intended to set forth all 
future potential liens. However, it does mean to suggest 
that as of the date of the conveyance that the grantor will 
warrant against all encumbrances and liens. The 1 iens will 
be of records, the encumbrances may or may not be of record. 
12. The respondents do not argue with the point of 
Amicus Curiae that future liens will not be covered by a 
warranty, except in the situation where the right for such a 
lien exists at the time of the conveyance in the form of a 
bona fide encumbrance and is ripened pursuant to statute or 
law into a perfected lien after the date of said conveyance. 
POINT SIX 
RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEY FEES 
Respondents reassert their right to be awarded by this 
court or to have an order issued by this court directing the 
trial court to fix a reasonable attorneys fee herein in favor 
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for having had 
to bring this litigation in order to assure their protections 
under 57-1-12 UCA, 1953 as amended, to receive t_heir land 
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances as well as for 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents would urge that t.he findings of the trial 
court be preserved, that the Roosevelt Special Improvement 
District be found to have constituted an encumbrance against 
said property from and after the date the Improvement 
District was created in April, 1974, which encumbrance 
continued until it was perfected to a lien in October, 1976. 
In addition, respondents would respectfully suggest that 
this court should either enter or direct that the trial court 
enter a finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to a 
reasonable attorneys fee herein for having had to pursue this 
action together with its costs for having had to obtain 
counsel to respond to the brief of Amicus Curiae and 
preparing a response to the brief of Amicus Curiae herein. 
Respectfully submitted 
G~J~~-
Attorney for Respondents 
P.O. Box 246 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the L d day of April, 1979, I 
mailed a true copy of the foregoing Respondents' Reply To 
Brief Amicus Curiae to Ralph J. Marsh and Scott w. Cameron, 
attorneys for Amicus Curiae, 61 South Main Street, Suite 500, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Gayle F. McKeachnie and Clark 
B. Allred, attorneys for Appellants, The Bryson Building, 53 
South 200 East, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
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